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This note tries to apply two versions of Sah and Stiglitz's "The Architecture of Economic Systems:
Hierarchies and Polyarchies" model (S&S) to highlight some important differences between the
development paths of India, the largest democracy, and China, the largest of the few remaining
communist ruled economies. It argues that the original S&S model is applicable to private organisations
but not to governments, to which a revised model is applied. It is the reliability of the government’s
decisions and the ability of the investor to rely on them that the modified S&S model tries to capture.
As a communist country, China is as centralized as a huge polity of its size can be. A decision of the
central authorities, a contract or promise confirmed by Beijing, can be relied upon. This provides a degree
of security to the investor that his contract will be honoured and she will not be dispossessed. In the
Indian federation the investor has to assure herself that all authorities involved agree to support her
project, because any agency that has any say may be able to derail it. These differences are accounted for
by the adjusted Sah and Stiglitz model. These differences affect not only the total quantity of investments
but also their composition. 
Clearly, no claim is made or implied that the models introduced below provide the explanation for the
differences in the development paths of these two Asian giants in the past few decades. They merely add
a new perspective to the economic systems dimension of the development process. 
JEL codes: P51, O53, O57, L19, D23.
Keywords: Hierarchies vs. polyarchies; Indian development; China's development.
1. Introduction
Communist countries seem to have an advantage in the early stages of
development: they seem to be able to shake up their atrophied social structures and
mobilize all resources and start upon a fast lane of growth. However, this strategy puts
up inflexible structures and soon meets obstacles it cannot overcome. As a result the
frontrunners are overtaken by the former laggards, the open market economies that
were slower to take off. This, at least, was how post World War II European experience
appeared, where Communist states have managed to sprint into development and
growth faster than similarly placed democratic market economies: see Table 1. Yet all
European communist economies arrived at a ceiling that stopped their growth and let
the market economies overtake them and leave them far behind.
3 Most of them tried to
change course and introduce more decentralization and flexibility into their economy -
without weakening their centralized political structures - but failed.  They found it
impossible to change their economic regime without ditching the communist party's
centralized control. The question arises: can a communist economy leave its economic
1  Revised version of paper presented at the EACES Workshop on "The Economic Development of
China and India: Determinants, Features and Consequences", held at the University of Perugia (Italy),
June 26, 2009. The workshop's participants and two referees helped me remove quite a few errors, and I
am grateful to them for their help
2  The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
3  The sharp decline in growth is more difficult to document without at the same time throwing doubt on
the claim of the initially faster rate. See Appendix A.
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trajectory, open up and join the new fast lane, without giving up its political institutions?
On the face of it the comparison of the paths taken by China and India would seem an
ideal response to the riddle, with a resounding positive answer: Yes, the communist
development model can be left at will at a convenient junction and transition to market-
led growth may be costless. It seems that such a switch by a communist state is much
easier than a policy change and an opening up in a democratic country, the largest one
that exists, India. My aim in this note is to examine the role of system and policy in this
story, where arguably the most important policy decision is the decision about system
change. Clearly, the factors discussed below may add to existing explanations of the
paths taken by these two countries, and cannot claim to comprehend the myriad of
factors that have shaped their development.
Table 1: Output growth, main capitalist and socialist economies, 1956 to 1970s (Annual. percentage
compound rate of growth)
Country







Capitalist Market    
 Industrial western Europe 4.6 4.5 4.7
 Southern Europe 5.9 5.3 6.3
 United States 3.7 2.8 4.6
Socialist world    
 Eastern Europe 7.0 7.6 6.5
Source: UN-ECE, Economic Survey of Europe, 1972, Table 1.2.
China, as a communist state, the first to liberalize its economy without letting go
of the tight political control, has become a role model for the few remaining socialist
countries.  Ever since the accession of Deng Xiaoping to China's leadership slow,
hesitant  yet  consistent  steps  were  taken  to  permit  the  entry  of  non-state
entrepreneurship, and later even allowing the privatization of large chunks of its state-
owned sector (Economist, 1996d, 1997a, 1997c, 2000; Boltho, 2009). The response of
the economy has been remarkable, with an accelerated and enviable rate of growth. A
comparison with India may lead to the idea that its success can be credited to the
centralized control of the Communist Party of China that may have given it advantages
that India lacks because of its democratic and federal structure. 
India among the non-communist states is also an exception. It did not follow
the development paths of the group of Asian states to its east. India's original growth
model relied on import substitution in a closed economy and on an effort to preserve
traditional sectors and technologies, while some of its neighbors, the Asian tigers,
opened their economies and darted forward.
4 These countries, much smaller than the
Indian elephant, managed to sprint ahead to arrive at relatively high levels of affluence
during recent decades, while India was lagging behind. Its growth started late and has
been accelerating only in the last few years. Was this due to policy choices or to system
changes, namely the modification of economic institutions?
4  As for Japan - it was far ahead when India became independent and was not considered as a role
model.
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My aim in this paper is to examine this question from the point of view of an
economic comparativist, and to look at the systemic and policy differences and
similarities between these two giant countries and how they affected their development.
To point out, in particular, those elements of the systemic institutions of India and
China that shape the incentive of entrepreneurs, both inside and outside of the
countries, and lead them to take very different choices in each country. It will use some
elements of the Koopmans and Montias seminal model of economic systems (1971) and
two versions of the hierarchy vs. polyarchy model by Sah and Stiglitz (1986, S&S
below). The original model, denoted S&S-M where the M stands for market, it is
claimed below, is a good representation of different forms of market organization, while
S&S-G, where G stands for government,  can represent some characteristics of
governmental organization that may effect very different paths of development. In its
focus will be the governmental institutions of these countries. Section  deals with this
theoretical introduction.
The economic histories of India and China, countries that were endowed with
their present political regime at almost the same time - 1947 and 1949 respectively, is
too well known to require detailed presentation. All that will be presented here is a brief
set of stylized historical facts, a very concise picture of the history of the institutions of
India in Section  and those of China in Section . Section  applies the modified Sah &
Stiglitz model to China, the hierarchy, and India, the polyarchy. Section  concludes with
some comments on the relevance of the analysis to the study of economic systems.
2. The system as a polyarchy or a hierarchy
Let me recap the simple notation introduced by Koopmans and Montias in their
seminal paper (1971):
() ,, s of e s p = ,
where  e is the environment,  s the system, and  p the policy, and where the
outcome vector o depends on the interaction between the three sets of arguments. We
can think of the environment and the system as the state variables, and on system-
dependent policies as control variables that affect the system's equations of motion. The
latter, besides impinging on the simultaneous outcomes, also affect the environment.
Investment and education change the amount of capital and production depletes
resources. The system is changed by legislation. But not only: the manner in which rules
are enforced may also be a system-changing factor, when enforcement does not
conform to the principles that lie at the basis of the formal rules. Thus bribes to corrupt
officials enable a party to thwart their enforcement. The perception of the outcomes of
given policies, rather than the outcomes themselves, may also affect policies and the
development of the system. These dynamic aspects can be put as follows:
() ,, s
de
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That is, given the environment and the ruling system, policies determine, inter
alia, the change in resources and system.  Figure 1 depicts the Koopmans-Montias
model.
The system is a set of interrelated institutions. We have learnt in the past few
decades that the institutions that protect property are arguably the most relevant to our
topic. They are the rules of the game that determine the relation between an actor's
decisions and her payoff. Assured property rights and the ability to enforce contracts
promise the entrepreneur that the fruits of her efforts and the risks she is taking will
accrue to her and not to others who might without such protection gain control of her
property. 
Environment System
L, Kp, Kh, N, Tech G instit., Civil soc.
Ps
Policies
Law, Ed., I, G
O
Outcomes
Cp, Cg, U, δp
I,RM,ecol.
Legisl., corrupt., Ed
Chng in public opinion
Glossary: L=labor, Kp=physical capital, Kh=human capital, N=natural resources, Tech=technology,
G=government, instit.=institutions,soc.=society, Ed.=education, I=investment, Cp=private
consumption, Cg=government consumption, δp=policy change, RM=raw materials, ecol.=ecology.
Figure 1: The system
 
It is noteworthy that Koopmans and Montias tried to get away from property
and ownership as primary system elements. They put the stress on custody instead, i.e.,
on the relationship of direct control of a resource rather than on its ownership. What we
have learned, observing both the continuous attempts at meaningful reforms in
communist countries (all of which, essentially, came to naught) and the process of
transition in the Soviet sphere, is that ownership and its security are of primary
importance. Reforms foundered because bonuses, which were to simulate profits, did
not stimulate managers to behave entrepreneurially, and transformation required assured
possession before it led to real change in behavior (Keren, 1992). In other words, the
importance of the incentives which a system establishes has gained prominence since
the pathbreaking work of Koopmans and Montias.
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The definition and protection of property is the  remit of governmental
institutions, and these are the set of institutions that will be at the focus of this paper.
They differ greatly between India - democratic and federal - and China - a communist
autocracy. A modification of Sah's and Stiglitz's influential model (1986) will be used to
characterize the governments of these two countries. Sah and Stiglitz considered two
alternative types of organizations charged with selecting investment projects: a vertical
organization, where a project would first be vetted by the lowest tier of the hierarchy
and if accepted by it, be reexamined in strict hierarchical order by each and every one of
its superiors. The project would be approved if and only if all hierarchical authorities
found it worthwhile. See Figure 2. The alternative organization is a polyarchy, where the
organization is horizontal and a project is examined by any of its members who then
decide whether to accept or reject it. Each arriving project is either profitable or not, but
the examining bureaucrats may err in their evaluation. As a result errors of type II, i.e.,
approval of a project that should not be accepted, are minimized under hierarchy and
errors of type I, i.e., rejection of projects that should be implemented - under polyarchy.
An important assumption is that the bureaucrats' interests are those of the organization,
and that they themselves have no interests of their own. This model, denoted below the
S&S-M  model,  is  an  apt  description  of  the  business  world:  larger  firms  and
corporations, which are perforce structured hierarchically, may be good at weeding out
poor projects. A collection of small independent firms may try many unpromising
projects yet may hit upon projects which the giant corporation has missed. Different
regimes, different systems, may encourage the growth of a different type of producing
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Figure 2: Polyarchy vs hierarchy
The S&S-M model is arguably less suitable for the analysis of different types of
government.  For this we use the modified S&S-G model, in which the two last
assumptions are adjusted and altered. We know that members of organizations, any
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organization, have their own interests, and we cannot just assume away the implicit
conflict of interests between their own and the imputed interests of the organization at
large. Thus different bureaucrats may agree about the objective characteristics of a given
project, yet one may wish to adopt it while the other does all in her power to torpedo it.
This is surely the state of affairs when we consider the differing interests and contrary
behavior of central vs. local government. Furthermore, in a hierarchy not every project
has to go through all of its tiers. Each project is presented at the relevant level, where
relevance is determined by size or type of project, and then sent down for evaluation.
Once accepted by the appropriate level all lower tiers are committed not to stand in its
way. Once these modifications are agreed, the two alternatives' characteristics look quite
different:
• Hierarchy:  the  decision  that  counts  is  that  of  the  highest  level  of  the
administration that is involved - lower levels' task is to supply information and
possibly state their own interests, but the superior makes her decision that may
ignore and override those of the lower levels.
• Polyarchy: several overlapping instances, local authorities and various ministries,
may have authority over the issue at hand, and a binding decision can be got only
if all instances, governmental or civil, agree. Otherwise, as long as there are
dissenting interests, the decision may be vetoed by a blocking party.
Once this is the case, it becomes clear that China, the hierarchy, can commit
itself not to renege on commitments to investors, whereas in India the latter can never
be sure that any agreement will be honored.  Yet in China everything depends on
government policy; once the policy decision is made to encourage non-state, including
foreign, investment, investors can be assured that the predator-state will not touch their
capital, as long as the policy remains in place. This means that transaction costs are
relatively  low.   Not  so  in  India,  the  polyarchy:  there,  in  those  spheres  where
governments, local, state and central, have authority or where their imprimatur or
assistance is required, the investor may always fear that one of the involved bodies will
wish to scuttle the potentially productive capital and turn it into a white elephant.
Transaction costs are therefore very high. The effects of the two governmental regimes
on the development path will be discussed in section , following concise histories of
India’s and China’s economies.
3. India
The two great leaders of pre-independence India have, for many decades, left
their imprint on the economic development of the biggest democracy. The heritage of
the great prophet of the Indian Way, Gandhi, has led to the reservation of wide swathes
o f i n d u s t r y a n d s e r v i c e s t o t r a d i t i o n a l  small-scale  producers  using  traditional
technologies. The first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, has initiated a socialist path of
development based on import substitution. Both have led to the sealing of the economy
to imports by high and variable custom tariffs and the erection of paraphernalia of
planning agencies and an extensive bureaucracy of controls and licensing, launching
what has become known as the  License Raj. This meant that the red tape that
entrepreneurs had to undergo and the strict licensing requirements imposed on
producers for any change in their production and employment were expensive and time
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.itMichael Keren, China and India - Hierarchy vs. Polyarchy in Economic Growth
consuming. An important result of the economic regime has been very high obstacles in
the way of both firm exit and new entry and a de facto support of monopolies and
oligopolies, both private and publicly owned. To support loss-making firms that were
not permitted to fire workers or cease operation a cost plus regime was instituted and
subsides paid. In many respects the economic policy differed on paper little from that of
communist countries. What differed greatly was the political regime and its efficacy. 
It is important to realize that this affected the incentives of both the suppliers of
licenses and those who required them. The former learned to thrive on bribes and
corruption. The latter learned that close relations with the bureaucrats in New Delhi and
the various states were much more important than cultivating their customers. The
effects  on  the  business  sector  did  not  differ  much  from  those  of  the Soviet
environment: high cost, low quality production, little innovation.
The policy that imposed the license Raj led, through the law of unintended
consequences, to important changes in the system and on the nature of the civil service.
The latter, which used to be relatively efficient and clean during the British rule, soon
became venal and corrupt (Pritchett, 2009). This is an element that increased transaction
costs, by the uncertainty that it introduced to doing business in India and by the bribes
that were required. A reversal of this system change will be a long and costly process. 
India was and still is a democracy, and a federal democracy at that. Although the
federal government in New Delhi has the right to depose state governments, and has
used  this  authority  extensively  during  several  past  periods,  the  power  of  state
governments is real. Furthermore, the government bureaucracy is also a force to be
reckoned with to derail projects that have not received its blessing. The country also has
a very lively civil society and an open press. Unlike the single-party communist bloc
country, India has many non-governmental power centers, from trades unions to local
action groups that often have the power to block government policies (Economist,
2008b). They too are among the actors in the polyarchy.
These circumstances affected property rights. On the one hand, the courts
enforce these rights even against government policy (as will be seen in the example of
the Nano, below). On the other, the owner was highly restricted in her ability to dispose
of her property, being unable to close down or shift at will to a different line of
production, and being highly dependent on bureaucratic decisions in any policy choice
she may care to make.
Policy change started in the 1991 and accelerated in the new century (Watkin,
1998). Tariffs were slashed - they fell from an average of 90% in 1991 to 30% in 1997
(Economist, 2009h) - and many restrictions and licensing requirements were abolished.
Thus the range which was freed from the polyarchy's stifling control has been
expanding, attracting non-governmental initiatives into wider fields, mainly into many
services. This trend has continued (World Bank, 2009). Nevertheless, property rights are
both too weak and too strong to favor entry. The Enron-Bhopal case, where poor
coordination between state and central authorities allowed the foreign investors to
impose very favorable conditions, have served as a lesson to both Indian authorities and
potential investors that large FDI in utilities was all but impossible (Allison, 2001; IEO,
1997). The case of Tata's plans to produce the Nano, the world's cheapest car, in West
Bengal that were thwarted by local agricultural interests that did not enable the local
government to provide it with the land on which this project was to be built, is an
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example of property rights that are too strong (Economic Times, 2009; Economist,
2008b).
Although  polyarchy  in  many  spheres  has  been  weakening,  it  has  been
strengthening until recently in the highest sphere, in the government. The political
weakness of the government, due to the splintering of the political parties and unstable
coalitions, means that it is difficult to tailor policies to recognized needs. The weakening
of the License Raj has been slowed, yet it has been advancing in small steps toward its
dismantlement.
5 Yet its most dangerous effects have been in the budgetary sphere. It
has proven too hard for the weak coalitions that ruled India to balance the budget, to
collect taxes from the agricultural sector, and to collect payments for electric power and
to stop its theft. The result has been a very low investment in infrastructure that hobbles
the economy and hampers private investment (Economist, 2008d, 2009a). 
4. China
Present day China was born a couple of years after India became independent.
Mao shaped her first three decades, and the following three were devoted to the
undoing of his heritage in the economic sphere while keeping intact the political
structure he left behind (yet with fewer system changing policy tsunamis than he was
wont to unleash from time to time). The system of resource allocation under Mao
became more and more similar to that of the Stalinist blueprint, yet with a more
decentralized organization, and with an agricultural system that though fully nationalized
had not completely erased the marks of the past.
The dismantling of Mao's economy was not done in accordance with a pre-
arranged grand design, but in a series of hesitant steps. These were launched by Deng
Xiaoping at the end of the 1970s with a gradual freeing of agriculture (the introduction
of the so-called system of responsibility in agriculture) and a breakup of the huge
communes that were erected in Mao's times. The essence of the freeing of industry was
to allow the entry of non-state entities, starting with the so-called Township-and-Village
Enterprises (TVEs) and their rapid expansion in the 1980s, which gave some autonomy
to the peasantry and increased the authority of local government. This was followed by
the permission of joint ventures with foreign investors and later to freer foreign
investments, conjoined with a slow build-up of a market economy which coexisted side-
by-side with state-owned industry (Xu and Zhang, 2009). Next came attempts to
subordinate the latter too to market discipline, the sale of some enterprises and the
closing down of others, smaller ones (Economist, 1996c, 1996d). These changes did not
weaken the hierarchical nature of the economic regime. They delegated the authority to
make investment decisions to lower levels, yet maintained the full authority of this level
over all its subordinates, allowing no parallel body, such as courts of law, challenge its
decisions. One of the important results of these changes was a change in the mix of
investments,  from  government  initiated,  often  by  its  highest  reaches,  to  fairly
decentralized decision makers, whose nature was changing with the progress of reforms.
Private investors, mainly foreign ones, could even shop around and locate the regional
authorities which were most amenable to their requirements.
6
5  See Alfaro (2009), for the effects of reforms on the business sector.
6  See Li and Putterman for a more extensive disscussion of the reforms.
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Yet all these reforms were sanctioned by the strong central government, i.e., by
the party. The central authorities in Beijing always have the last word, and an
undertaking by any given level of government in China will always be honored by
subordinate authorities. This is an important difference between China and India: China
does not have the alternative loci of power that India has in both the government and
the civil society. This means that the Chinese government is a true hierarchy, and any
outside body, e.g., a potential investor, can be sure that an undertaking by the
competent authority can be depended upon, as long as the FDI encouraging policy is
maintained.
But there is also a cost to the unrestricted strength of the government. Property
rights are assured as a matter of policy, and if policy ever changes there is no
constitutional  guarantee against dispossession;  unlike India,  with  its  strong  legal
institutions, in China legal protection against the state is inconceivable. The courts are
gaining effectiveness in litigation between private parties, but are powerless where the
state is involved.
7 Yet property rights are ill-defined, and locals' rights are murkier
(Economist, 2003).
8 Enforcement of judgments is another matter (Economist, 2005c).
Furthermore, the state at all levels imposes its industrial policy on the state-owned
sector, which is still very large, and large parts of the ostensibly private sector. And the
strong central control by a leadership that does not change, as in a democracy, even a
centralized one, leads to some rigidity. An example will be met in section  below.
5. India and China: the outcomes
This section maps the effects of the institutional portraits of India and China on
the economic outcomes. They are based, as far as possible, on statistical data, most of
which cover the period of 1970 to the present. They are usually displayed as ratios
between China and India. This emphasizes, for any given indicator, both the differences
between the two countries at any given point of time, as well as their trend over time.
The most obvious outcomes concern total investment, both local and FDI, and the
nature of entrepreneurship.
5.1. Rate of investment
In India, high government deficits lead to a low rate of investment, while the
stronger government in China enables it to maintain the desired budgetary position and
free resources for investment. As a result the ratio of investment in GDP should be
higher in China than in India. This is most obvious in the comparison of shares of GDP
devoted to investment, whose share in GDP is throughout the period of nearly four
decades higher by roughly 40 per cent (Panel B of  Table 2 and  Figure 3). It is
noteworthy that per capita investment can be seen to diverge significantly only after the
7  A judgment against a state agency in a trademark case is an exception that does not disprove the rule.
This related to a mere procedural question, namely who may apply to the government's trademark
bureau in the name of the trademark seeker (Economist, 2004b). 
8 "…Local government's seizure … of hundreds of privately controlled oil wells into which hundreds of
millions of dollars have been sunk" (Economist, 2003) reports on dispossession of local investors, but
new legislation that restricted competition with the post office hit locals and giant foreigners alike
(Economist, 2009g). See also (Economist, 2008c).
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end of the 1980s (Panel A of Table 2 and ). The resulting growth of GDP accelerates at
about the same time, indicating perhaps that private, particularly foreign, investment
was much more productive than state investment that predominated up to the Deng
reforms (section ). This can be seen in the sharp take off of the ratio of China's GDP
per capita to that of India in the 1990s. The ratios of per capita physical and total
investment in China to that of India also shows an increase from this time, but it is
much less steep than the relative rise in GDP per capita. The latter grew from rough
equality with that of India, in 1970, when the ratio is just under 100%. The GDP ratio
has been growing until the start of the current decade, and by 2006, China's GDP pc
level was over two and a half that of India. The share of investment in India has been
rising in the last few years, but it is still only 70-75% of the Chinese share in GDP. 
 
Table 2: China-India ratios - GDP and investment 1970-2006, selected years 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Panel A
GDP pc 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.6 2.1 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6
Gross capital
formation pc 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
Gross fixed capital
formation pc 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3
Panel B
Gross invt,
GDP share 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
Gross fixed invt,










1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
Gross invt, GDP share Gross fixed invt, GDP share
Figure 3: China-India - investment ratios (Share in GDP)










1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
GDP pc Gross capital formation pc Gross fixed capital formation pc
Figure  4: China-India - GDP and investment ratios (1990 US$)
5.2. Foreign direct investment
In spite of the attraction of the potentially huge market, FDI in India has been
low due to hurdles imposed by India and investors' high transaction costs, whereas in
China the lure of a billion consumers and cheap labor has drawn in a flood of FDI.
Actual experience can be gleaned from Table 3,
9 and Figure 5 and Figure 6. The flow of
FDI to China in the years around 1990 was nearly 35-40 times that to India (Figure 6).
10
The difference has been declining, yet even in 2006 the flow to China was still over 2.5
times greater. The stock of FDI shows similar trends, although here the differences are
slightly smaller: it was over a 20 times larger in the mid-1990s, and even the latest figures
are still put it at three times larger (Panel B of Table 3). It is interesting to note that
despite its low level, the flow (and stock) of FDI as a share of total capital formation
and of GDP was higher in India than in China during the most recent years, because of
the low share - relative to China - of investment in GDP.
11
9  Hong Kong has also been listed in Table 3, because it is clear from the enormous level of FDI that it
has been used as a conduit for investment in China. It has not been included in Panel B and the two
figures, because shifts of FDI from Hong Kong to China in the latest reports of the World Investment
Report show that UNCTAD have tried to take care of this problem and correct their figures.
10 For an indication that FDI is indeed growth promoting in China and India see Baek and Won (2009).
11 Some of the figures in the table, those relating to the final couple of years were computed out of others
in the same series. The large jumps in stocks in recent years are hard to comprehend. Thus the increase
in stocks in 2007 compared to previous years exceeds the sum of investment in the intervening years.
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Table 3: FDI flows, China, Hong Kong and India, 1979-2008, selected years (Current US$m)
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2002 2005 2007 2008
Panel A: inward FDI flow 
 China  0 1,419 3,393 33,767 40,319 52,743 72,406 83,521 108,312
 Hong Kong  648 1,288 2,041 7,828 24,578 9,682 33,618 54,365 63,003
 India  49 19 252 974 2,168 5,627 7,606 25,127 41,554
 China / India 0.0 73.8 13.5 34.7 18.6 9.4 9.5 3.3 2.6
 China / India,
inflow % GDP 0.0 50.7 8.8 19.4 7.7 3.2 3.4 1.3 0.7
a
 China / India,
inflow % gross I 0.0 36.5 8.3 13.2 5.4 02.02.00 2.3 0.9 0.6
Panel B: inward FDI stock 
 China  .. 4,104 17,204 74,151 186,189 216,503 272,094 327,087 378,083
 Hong Kong  .. 183,487 198,378221,319 405,266 336,278 523,186 1,177,46
1 835,764
 India  .. 641 1,420 3,490 15,426 25,419 44,458 105,429 123,288
 China / India, total
stocks .. 6.4 12.1 21.2 12.1 8.5 6.1 3.1 3.1
 China / India, stock
% GDP .. 4.4 8.0 11.9 5.0 3.0 2.2 1.1 0.9
 China / India, stock
% gross I .. 3.2 7.5 8.1 3.5 2.0 1.5 0.9 0.7
a
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     China       Hong Kong       India 
Figure 5: China, Hong Kong and India, FDI inflows, current US$m, 1980-2008












1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
FDI flow  pc,US$ FDI inflow , % GDP FDI inflow % gross I
Figure 6: China-India FDI inflow ratios, per capita, per cent of GDP and gross capital
formation, current US$, 1980-2008
Figure 7: China-India inward FDI stock ratios, per capita, per cent of GDP and gross
capital formation, current US$, 1980-2008
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5.3. Entrepreneurial efforts
India's entrepreneurial efforts are directed mostly toward fields in which neither
the government's help is required nor its interference feared, i.e., in services. Investment
in manufacturing is therefore relatively low, as can be seen in Table 5 and Figure 8,
which compare the industrial structure in both countries.  Whereas the share of
manufacturing in China has exploded, exhibiting the advantage taken of its low labor
costs and large market, India's is low and shows little growth over the past four decades.
Furthermore, the protection of traditional sectors can be seen in the slow decline of
agriculture and other primary industries and very large 'other industries' that include the
traditional trading sector. This difference is accentuated in Table 4, which shows how
low production of hi-tech industries in India is, lower as a share of total industrial
production than in any of the listed countries, whereas China's equals the average share
in all countries listed in the NSF table (where the data originate). Among the countries
selected for this table it is lower only than the share of hi-tech in the US.
12 In India their
share in the past dozen years has hardly budged, and in this it is joined only by Japan,
whose freeze is explicable by the slowdown in its growth over the past couple of
decades. Yet there are a few areas in which developments in services seem to have had
an effect on industrial growth: office and computing machinery, and communication
equipment (see below). China advanced on a broad front, and its presence among in the
hi-tech industries has increased from nearly India's present day level in 1980 to over
four time this share early in this century (Table 4). Combining this with the information
about the relative size of the industrial sector (Table 5), puts the share of hi-tech
industries in China's GNP at roughly 9%, while India's is under 1% of its ( much lower)
income level. 
The growth of the IT sector in India is too well known to deserve elaboration. It
seems to have supported the relative growth of the communications and computing
machines industries. Another surprising sector is medicine: India is becoming an
exporter of high quality health services (Economist, 2009f). Yet this has left no trace on
the pharmaceutical and medical instruments industries, whose share in manufacturing
has shrunk.
13 In China, although the inward flood of FDI which indicates trust in
China’s respect for private property, at least foreigners’, this is the case once contracts
have been signed, yet coming to an agreement is not simple since state authorities are
often involved in negotiations with firms, and these seem to aim at restricting of foreign
investors' profits (Economist, 2004a), and investors who planned to sell in the local
market need partners for joint ventures (Economist, 1996a). The poor definition of
property rights may lead to disappointments, when authorities disregard assumed rights.
Local firms are subject to the government’s industrial policy (Economist, 1996b, 1997b,
2005a, 2005b). The original plan was to create champions, chaebol-like conglomerates
(Economist, 1997d, 2005a), and several Chinese firms, such as Haier in household
electric goods and Lenovo in laptop computers, have gained a foothold in foreign
markets.
12 Observe that the figures in Table 4 report total output levels, not value added, and can thereofre not
easily be compared to any natioanl accounts data.
13 Given the known strength of India's generic drugs industry, this is surprising.
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Table 4: Share of hi-tech industries in industrial production, selected countries, 1980-2003, selected years
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003
Share of High technology industries in total industrial production
Total production
a 8.1 9.5 10.6 11.2 16.5 17.7
United States 10.2 11.2 12.4 12.2 25.4 30.3
Expanded EU 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.2 5.0 6.6
Japan 6.8 11.8 14.1 14.7 16.3 14.9
China 4.2 5.8 6.3 6.8 12.9 17.7
India 2.0 2.0 3.7 4.8 4.9 4.9
Share of industry in total hi-tech industries:
Aircraft
Total production 23.7 18.5 17.7 11.7 8.1 7.9
United States 39.5 35.3 37.1 20.9 8.4 6.7
Expanded EU 11.6 9.8 8.6 8.7 7.4 4.3
Japan 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.6 2.1 3.7
China 11.3 10.5 9.8 14.2 11.9 9.3
India 4.1 5.1 2.3 2.5 2.0 1.8
Pharmaceuticals
Total production 19.3 17.8 18.1 18.7 13.3 14.1
United States 16.0 16.0 17.7 18.6 9.3 8.9
Expanded EU 31.8 32.6 29.9 24.9 18.7 12.7
Japan 19.8 12.2 12.7 14.8 14.2 16.7
China 38.0 24.3 24.3 18.5 11.2 9.5
India 72.6 61.9 44.4 50.9 38.1 36.9
Office and computing machinery
Total production 8.3 11.5 13.2 15.9 19.2 18.7
United States 1.1 3.3 5.2 12.8 18.1 15.7
Expanded EU 3.8 3.4 3.6 6.9 7.4 19.3
Japan 20.0 23.3 26.0 23.3 20.3 14.7
China 10.9 4.9 5.0 9.3 34.6 40.2
India 1.3 1.8 6.5 7.3 14.6 16.8
Communication equipment
Total production 23.8 28.9 31.1 36.0 47.7 48.6
United States 9.6 9.2 7.8 16.6 51.1 57.5
Expanded EU 31.6 31.4 30.1 31.1 39.9 43.7
Japan 42.7 50.6 49.3 52.1 56.0 58.2
China 31.6 50.0 53.9 50.5 36.8 36.8
India 6.5 20.9 32.3 30.3 36.4 35.2
Medical, precision, & optical instruments
Total production 25.0 23.2 20.0 17.7 11.7 10.7
United States 33.8 36.2 32.3 31.0 13.1 11.2
Expanded EU 21.2 22.9 27.8 28.4 26.6 20.1
Japan 16.0 12.7 10.9 8.2 7.3 6.8
China 8.2 10.2 7.0 7.6 5.5 4.3
India 15.4 10.3 14.5 9.0 8.9 9.2
a. NOTES: Production is total gross output in 70 countries or economies.
Source: Science and Engineering Statistics, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics.
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Table 5: GNI breakdown at constant 1990 prices in US Dollars
Industry - share in GNI (per cent) 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007
 China
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 52.9 35.8 26.9 14.5 11.1
Manufacturing 26.6 35.8 36.7 49.9 52.9
Transport, storage and communication 5.3 5.7 6.1 7.5 8.1
Other industries 15.1 22.7 30.2 28.1 27.9
 India
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 42.7 36.8 30.2 22.2 18.1
Manufacturing 12.7 14.0 16.9 17.5 17.5
Transport, storage and communication 4.2 5.7 6.5 8.3 10.9
Other industries 40.3 43.6 46.4 51.9 53.5
 China / India ratio
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 1.24 0.97 0.89 0.65 0.62
Manufacturing 2.09 2.56 2.17 2.85 3.01
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Figure 8: China and India, industrial structure, 1970-2007
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5.4. The nature of entrepreneurship
The nature of entrepreneurship differed greatly.  In China, the direction of
development of state-owned enterprises and even private firms - which often are state
connected (Economist, 1997b, 2005b, 2009j) - is guided by government industrial
policy. The evidence on this score can, unfortunately, not be put is statistical tables. The
Chinese, as befits firms guided by official industrial policy, usually copied foreign
business plans and foreign technologies (Economist, 2009b). Even where there is a local
break-through, as in the case of lithium car batteries, it is tied into the government's
plan to make China the leader in the production of the electric car (New York Times,
2009; Economist, 2009i). Successful Indian entrepreneurs developed new business plans
and even new products (Economist, 2009b). This is true for the automobile industry
(Richet, 2008). Tata's Nano is one example (Economist, 2008a,c, 2009c,e,g). Designed
to be the world's cheapest car and ideally suited to its home market, it may of course fail
either because of the world-wide crisis that started just as the firm was gearing up for
production or because its attempt to start operations in West Bengal was foiled, after
considerable investments on the site, by the inability to acquire the needed land
(Economic Times, 2009; Economist, 2009e).
6. Conclusions
At first glance China seems to have solved the problem of transition: starting off
as a strong centralized autocracy, nationalizing and mobilizing all national resources,
breaking up conservative change-hindering social bonds, and then, at just the right
moment, transforming itself into an open capitalist economy that draws in an avalanche
of foreign investments and grows at a rapid rate to become soon, it is averred by all
knowledgeable observers, the largest economy in the world (e.g., Maddison, 2009, p.
436). India seems not to have a chance of ever coming near, given the great difference
between their present level of development and speed of growth. 
The problem with this, to China, optimistic prophecy is only that the state has
not entirely withdrawn from micro-management of the economy, and continues to try
to nudge Chinese firms to develop in accordance with centrally dictated prescriptions.
Now the wisdom of one chapter of this policy can surely not be disputed: the
development of an infrastructure that serves as a generic growth catalyst that supports
growth in all branches of the economy. The attempt to cultivate winners, chaebol-like
champions, is more dangerous. There are even reports of imposition of technological
solutions, e.g., the attempt to force communication network producers to integrate an
independent 3G standard (whose only effect seems to have been to raise development
costs and delay the introduction of the equipment of some firms [Economist, 2009j]).
Now the jury is still out on whether MITI in Japan, and parallel institutions in Korea
and Taiwan, helped or hindered development, yet, given the rapid technological changes
of our times, any governmental attempts to guess the course of future development has
surely become hazardous. China may nevertheless succeed because of its culture of
commercial entrepreneurship and it enormous size that will continue to draw in
investors from around the globe, but this may happen in spite of and not thanks to the
government's industrial policy.
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The case of India is different. Here the heart of the matter is that the
government is too weak, and the saying goes that "[the Indian] economy grows at night
when the government is asleep” (Das, 2009). The government is unable to balance the
budget, to invest in infrastructure,
14 Yet Indian entrepreneurship is more daring than the
Chinese and leads to novel strategies and products, and may, once the central
government becomes stronger and manages to free itself from the shackles of
polyarchy, sprint ahead. Although the probability is low, India may yet draw nearer to
China, the front runner.
Let me repeat the word of caution with which I opened this paper: the
mechanisms behind the growth process of India and China are more complex and
multidimensional  than  any  partial  analysis  of  the  institutional-related  investment
processes can account for. For this reason, the partial perspective of the analysis should
be borne in mind when these conclusions are drawn.
15
14 The recent elections that have for the first time in decades permitted the formation of a government
that is not cobbled together from disparate parties with conflicting policies  may create a stronger
adminsistration that may be able to balance the budget and start some investment in power generation
(which cannot be left to FDI ever since the Enron fiasco) and transport. But given the past, some
scepticism is justified (Economist, 2009d).
15 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for the wording of this reservation.
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Appendix A: Did the European socialist countries grow faster in the post-
WW2 period?
The end of the Soviet economic system exposed the great difference between
productivity in East and West, between the socialist countries of Europe and the
western market economies. It also exposed the weakness of socialist statistics, and led to
some attempts at recalculation of the size of those economies and their post war
growth. The Economic Survey of Europe 2000 (UN-ECE, 2000) compares several of these
attempts, and reports one of these estimates. I have chosen to rely on the Maddison
estimates  which  are  reported  in  the  cited  source  because  it  had  the  clearest
documentation, and because it built upon the CIA and Alton estimates, which at their
time tried to use all available information to recalculate the economic output of the
Soviet Bloc.
16
Table A1: Estimates of rates of growth of GDP pc in the European socialist countries, 1951-2000
1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000
Bulgaria 6.2 5.1 2.4 -0.1 -3.0
Czechoslovakia 4.2 2.4 2.1 0.8 1.8
German Democratic Republic 4.0 3.3 3.0 0.2 1.4
Hungary 4.3 3.3 2.3 0.4 3.9
Poland 3.1 3.2 2.6 -0.6 3.0
Romania 4.9 4.5 3.7 -1.1 2.8
SFR of Yugoslavia 4.8 4.3 4.9 -0.3 -2.7
Soviet Union 3.7 3.5 1.5 0.8 -4.6
United States  1.6 2.9 2.2 1.9 1.9
European Union  4.1 4.0 2.5 2.1 1.6
Source: Table 5.4.2, Chapter 5: "Catching up and falling behind: economic convergence in Europe", UN-ECE, Economic
Survey of Europe, 2000 No. 1.
16 See citations of these sources in Chapter 5: "Catching up and falling behind: economic convergence in
Europe" in (UN-ECE, 2000).
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Western European growth rates, represented by the EU in the table, serve as the
baseline in the table: the growth rate of those countries that exceeded the EU's in a
given decade is printed in bold italics. As can be seen, five socialist countries grew faster
than the EU in the 1950s, three in the '60s, four in the '70s, none in the '80s, but then
again five in the post-socialist decade of the 1990s. This does indicate that the thesis on
the whole is correct: growth at the start was faster in some members of socialist world
than in the west, but it stopped in the fourth decade of the 1980s, when four counties
experienced negative growth, shrinkage. Yet the thesis holds only marginally: the excess
of East over West in the 1950s is slight, and the leader of the Bloc, the Soviet Union, is
never among those whose growth is fast. 
Furthermore, I have some doubt regarding these figures: they are based on the
national accounts of the socialist countries, and no attempt has been made to check the
extent of a possibly varying hidden inflation which may have affected these figures to a
different extent in different periods. Extant purchasing power comparisons have not
been used to check these calculations. A paper by the present author (Keren, 1987),
which tried to use comparisons of the purchasing power of the GDR's Ost Mark against
the Federal Republic's DM, shows that such inflation, or price drift, was strong in the
1950s and then again in the 1970s, but disappeared during the '60s. In other words,
while official growth rates were overstated in the 1950s and '70s, they were much less so
in the 1960s, the decade of the New Economic System of 1963-1970. By this reckoning
the reduction in growth between the 1960s to the '70s was much sharper than the 0.3
percent of  Table A1, and closer to 2 per cent. If the same applies to more Eastern
European economies, than the decline in competitiveness of the socialist economies was
sharper and started in the 1970, not the '80s.
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